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Abstract: 
Collective quality management systems are well known instruments to manage the quality 
and/or the safety of foodstuffs.  They can be considered as voluntary approaches to food 
safety. In environmental economics some empirical studies emphasize that firms entering into 
a collective voluntary program behave differently because their motivations differ. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is no formal discussion on the effectiveness of a collective voluntary 
program in which firms adopt different behaviour once they entered the program. Starting 
from this two strand of literature, we extend the analytical framework of collective voluntary 
approaches considering heterogeneous firms and applying it to food safety issues. We show 
that according to firm’s heterogeneity, in some situations increasing the number of inspections 
is useless and the effectiveness of the collective program  is  only  reliant  on  its  minimal 
requirements. We econometrically test our theoretical propositions on the case of the safety 
self-monitoring agreement, which exists on one of the most important import market of fresh 
produce in France. Our results lead us to discuss the design these new regulatory instruments 
and its relative cost-effectiveness from a societal point of view.  
Key Words: Voluntary Approaches, Food Safety, Collective Action, and Heterogeneity.  
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1. Introduction 
Voluntary programs are now well known instrument for reducing environmental damages 
created by polluting firms. This alternative to traditional environmental regulatory policies is 
well developed both in the European Union and the United States (Borkey and Leveque, 
1998). In the literature, there are now lots of studies dealing with voluntary approaches to 
environmental protection (see Khanna, 2001 for a survey). More often than not firms commit 
themselves in Voluntary Programs to avoid a more costly environmental policy imposed by 
public authorities and/or to communicate on their environmental friendly goodwill.  
These new regulation tools are not only used to deal with environmental threat (Segerson, 
1999). During the nineties, voluntary quality management systems have emerged in the food 
supply chain and could be assumed as voluntary approaches to food safety. In the agro food 
industry, voluntary initiatives from food operators have been developed and give new 
perspectives to the food supply chain. For example,  in the European fresh produce industry, 
systems like Eurep-Gap was primarily drafted and initiated by British retailers  because of 
their need to meet new requirements of the  due-diligence liability rule
1 (Fulponi, 2006).  
Even though it was first understood as a protection against prosecution, such a system is now 
worldwide adopted and thus changes the whole understanding of fresh produce supply all 
over the world.  
However, managing food safety differs from dealing with pollution reduction issues. Food 
safety is a particular attribute of food product.  For consumer, more often that not it is a 
credence attribute following the definition given by Darby and Karny (1973). However, food 
                                                 
1 The due diligence principle is defined under the Food Safety Act: It means ensuring that every reasonable 
precaution has been taken for every circumstance such that all concerned parties, for instance consumers, are 
protected. It also means that if a the firm has tried to meet its obligations and has done what is reasonable and 
still fails, then it would not be found guilty of wrongdoing in court.   3
safety becomes an experience attribute unfortunately when the more sensitive of consumers 
gets sick. From farm to fork, across boarders, food supply chain involves a large number of 
food operators who handle food products. However, there is a wide array of sources leading to 
potential sources of a food safety hazards and contamination. This induce some difficulties to 
identify the contamination source in the supply chain and then to identify, sue or prosecute the 
true responsible of the offence.   Moreover, the heterogeneity in food products can be 
exacerbated these difficulties according to the number of food operators (the length of the 
supply chain), of the type of food product (raw or processed, branded…). Food safety is 
directly linked to health risk. However, according to the kind of safety contamination, 
consequences for health are different. Indeed, a contamination can have instant and lethal 
effects (pathogenic contamination) or cumulative effects (pesticides residues). Sometimes, the 
effects on health are not well known (GMOs). Following a safety failure, all the operators of 
the food supply chain are under the commercial threat. A safety contamination, can lead to 
some spill-over effects both on the incriminated product but also on its substitutes and on the 
food industry as a whole (Biglaiser and Friedman, 1994). 
Contrarily, pollution issues are reliant to emissions/releases of pollutants in the air and/or 
water and involves either one firm or a group of firms within an industry. Non-source 
pollution is the only case for which it is not possible to perfectly identify who is the one 
responsible of pollution. Pollution is directly linked to environmental risk and indirectly 
linked to health risk. For example SO2 emissions are bad for global warming and for the 
quality of the air we breathe. For asthmatic people, the quality of air affects their health and 
can have strong consequences. Pollution failure from one firm has no spill-over effects on the 
industry as a whole.  More often than not, consumers are not aware of these accidents and the 
largest firms face to commercial stakes when a pollution accident occurs. In the food safety 
economics there is a bloom of analytical studies dealing with food suppliers’ voluntary   4
adoption of such food quality system (Segerson, 1999, Noelke and Caswell, 2000; Venturini, 
2003, Fares and Rouvière, 2006). However there is little formal discussion on food suppliers’ 
behavior in collective food safety management system (Giraud-Herault et ali, 2006). Such 
collective quality management systems as developed in Olson (1965) generate a collective 
action issue.  
In environmental domain, numerous empirical studies have emphasized this point. Firms, 
which join a collective program, don’t face the same institutional pressure and then will 
behave differently once committed in the voluntary collective program. Once the firm has 
committed itself to fulfill the agreement’s requirements, it could decide not to comply with 
the whole set of requirements. Firms thus may voluntary choose to partially free-ride on the 
effort provided by others (Delmas and Keller, 2004; Delmas and Montes 2005; King and 
Lennox 2001). These free-riding behaviors could then alter the credibility of the voluntary 
program and lead it to collapse.  
To the best of our knowledge, most theoretical papers dealing with collective environmental 
voluntary program consider models identical firms and define free-riders as firms which do 
not participate to the agreement (Dawson and Segerson, 2006; Millock and Salanié, 2003). 
Firms behave non-cooperatively at the participation stage. Once committed within the 
agreement they behave cooperatively and choose an effort level in accordance with the 
required one. There is no opportunistic behavior within the collective program.  
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we develop a model that takes into account firms’ 
heterogeneity in its specification and then consider that opportunistic behavior may exist 
within a collective voluntary program applied to food safety issues. Our model considers a 
third party that is independent from the group of firms that monitors and enforces the 
collective agreement through inspections in individual firms. According to the impact of 
firms’ heterogeneity we show that when the threat of being inspected is too low, whatever   5
their characteristics all firms would only refer to the minimal requirement of the collective 
agreement. In such a situation, the performance of the voluntary program only relies on this 
minimal level negotiated before the implementation of the program. Second, we test our 
theoretical propositions on firms’ behavior in the case of safety self-monitoring agreement, 
which exits on one of the most important market of import of fresh produce in France. Our 
empirical results lead us to discuss both the design of these collective voluntary programs and 
the way to ensure their performance, considered as the average level of safety effort within 
the group. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 refers to the related literature; Section 3 develops 
the analytical framework, Section 4 is dedicated to the research data and the methodology, 
Section 5 the econometric analysis and results and Section 6 provides a discussion. 
2. Related Literature 
Some empirical studies applied to the environmental domain outlined that firms could act 
differently in a voluntary agreement because they are heterogeneous. For example, Delmas 
and Keller (2005) focus on factors that favor or hamper free-riding within the U.S. EPA 
WasteWise voluntary program. They analyze how both the incentives to participate to a 
voluntary program and the firms’ characteristics affect the likelihood to free-ride within the 
agreement. They show that compliance behavior depends on the initial motivation that led 
firms to join the voluntary program. Joining the agreement is associated to private benefits 
like an increase in reputation firms are more likely to fully comply with the requirements of 
the program.  
In 2000, King and Lenox and then Delmas and Montes, in 2005 (2005) have distinguished 
two ways for firms to behave once firms commit themselves within in a collective voluntary 
agreement i) collaborative & symbolic and, ii) collaborative & substantive. In these studies, a   6
collaborative & symbolic behavior stands for firms which commit to the agreement and then 
do not fully comply with its requirements whereas a collaborative & substantive behavior 
characterize fully compliant firms. The authors distinguish early joiners from late joiners 
Early joiners differ from late joiners because of the institutional pressure they face, their 
visibility on the market their resources and finally, their environmental effort prior to 
participation. More often than not they are larger firms. They show that early joiners they are 
more likely to adopt a collaborative & substantive behavior.  
In the theoretical literature there is little formal discussion firms’behavoir once committed 
within a collective and industry-wide voluntary approaches dedicated to environmental 
protection. Dawson and Segerson (2006) developed a comprehensive model under which 
firms choose to participate in the program to avoid a more costly policy tax imposed by the 
government. The tax would be imposed either there is no voluntary initiative proposed by the 
industry: or if the group of participating firms fails to achieve the emission goal set by the 
public authorities. Under such assumptions, non-participating firms benefit from the level of 
pollution abatement reached by participating firms. Developing a three-stage model with n 
identical firms they show that there is always an incentive for a sub-group of firms within the 
industry to participate in voluntary agreement according to the existence of a sub-group of 
free-riders. Participating firms make higher abatement efforts to achieve the industry emission 
goal, internalizing the negative externalities generated by non-cooperative firms. Collective 
voluntary agreement is thus always preferred to a tax policy even if the model shows that, in 
some cases, it is not socially efficient. However, there are two limits in this paper. On the one 
hand, firms are identical. On the other hand, they assume that once committed in the 
collective agreement, firms well-behave and then fully comply without need of any 
enforcement to do so (MacEvoy and Stranlund, 2006).    7
In the food safety literature, most of studies emphasize firms’ decision to voluntary 
implement individual quality management system. For instance, Segerson (1999) develops a 
model to analyse the voluntary adoption by firms when a mandatory safety system is more 
costly than a voluntary one. She shows that the only credible mean to induce a firm to adopt 
voluntary preventive measures is a strong mandatory threat to be imposed a more costly 
system. Venturini (2003) assumes there is not a differential cost between a voluntary and a 
mandatory adoption of a quality management system. He shows that a strong mandatory 
threat is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to induce voluntary adoption.. Government 
intervention is needed: to help firms to signal their safety initiative to consumers. A second 
strand of literature considers that firms operate in the food supply chain. Noelke and Caswell 
(2000) explore the incentives to implement a voluntary system in a simplified supply chain. 
The authors show that the level of safety the firm implements through a voluntary quality 
management system are always higher than in all the other alternatives. However, this level of 
effort relies on the safety level implemented by upstream and downstream firms. Fares and 
Rouvière (2006) proposes a unified framework on these two literature strands. They show 
that, for food safety issues where the liability rule and reputation effect cannot be effective, a 
well-designed contract offered by “the downstream” firm is the only way to induce upstream 
firms to voluntarily implement safety measures. 
However, these studies do not consider that the food operator can choose to voluntary enter 
and implement a collective food safety management system. It is obvious that because these 
quality management systems are collective, they lead to a collective action issue as defined by 
Olson (1965). To the best on our knowledge, the only study available is the one of Giraud-
Hérault and al (2006). The authors propose a model of vertical integration between producers 
and retailers where a spot and a safe markets coexist. They derive the conditions under which 
such coexistence leads to an improvement of food safety. . The collective system should then   8
induce to an increase of the safety level on the market. However, they do not consider that 
opportunistic behaviour may occur within the group and then alter the average level of safety 
of the safe market. We borrow from these two literature strands to propose a model “à la 
Dawson-Segerson (2006)”. We extend the initial framework in order to take into account of 
firms’ heterogeneity and behavior in a collective voluntary program.  
3. Analytical Framework. 
We consider, a group of  N firms denoted by i and characterized by their size
i y  with 
} { n i ,.... ,2 1 ∈ ordered in increasing size. In the short run, the number of firms in the group is 
exogenous  (denoted by N) and known by all the firms. These firms have voluntarily joined an 
industry agreement to voluntarily monitor the safety of their products’. By joining the 
agreement, firms commit themselves to monitor the safety of their products on a regular basis. 
We assume that the group of firms doesn’t generate any externalities on firms that didn’t join 
the agreement. The group of firms thus produces a “club good” (non rival and excludable 
good) that would only benefit to the members of the agreement. We assume that the nature of 
the “club good” lays in the “collective reputation” or “group reputation” which benefits to all 
group members. We suppose that the “club good” we deal with allow members to signal 
themselves; being a member is thus viewed as a sign for a potentially high level of monitoring 
food safety. Joining the agreement is voluntary and free.  Such an agreement it is not legally 
binding and then could lead to a collective action issue as pointed out by Olson (1965). 
Contrarily to Dawson and Segerson (2006) we only refer to opportunistic behaviors within the 
group of firms and we do not consider that free riders might be outside of the group.  
In a first time, we follow the propositions suggested by Delmas and Keller (2006) and as King 
and Lennox (2000) shown we focus on the decision of firms which once committed in the   9
agreement and according to their individual characteristics (size, products, institutional 
pressure), firms would adopt differentiated behavior once committed within the group.   
In a second time, we characterize situations for which increasing the frequency of inspections 
lead to an increase of the performance of the collective program.  
Once committed in the agreement, we consider that the decision of the firm is binary:  
i) The firm can comply with the requirements of the agreement by providing the 
minimum level of effort required by the agreement, eL. Firms are considered as low-
effort firms, they implement the least they must do.  
ii) The firm can comply with the requirements of the agreement by providing an effort 
level eH that is higher than eL, that is eH>eL. Firms are considered as high-effort firms, 
they implement a higher level of effort than they must do. We consider that eH is 
exogenous.  
Let NH be the proportion of high-effort firms, then NL=N-NH is the proportion of low-effort 
firms.  
The production of the “club good” is not costless. Each participating firm to the agreement 
commits to contribute to the production of this “club good” through the implementation at 
least of the minimum level of safety monitoring effort that the agreement required. We 
assume that firms’ production costs function is given by  ) , (
i i e y C  is discontinuous. We assume 
that the production cost function of i is also convex as suggested by Antle (2001). ) , (
i i e y C  
denotes for the firm i  the cost of producing 
i y units of the good with the associated level of 
safety effort 
i e . ei is dichotomous,  } ; { L H i e e e = and the production cost function is strongly 
separable. Being a member of the collective agreement acts as a signal. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that a  and b  represent the costs for respectively high-effort firms and   10
low-efforts firms to provide the signal that participating to the collective agreement generates. 
We assume that {} [ ] 1 0. ; ∈ b a  and are such as  b a> .  However, the larger the proportion of low-
effort firms is the more costly it is for high-effort firms to maintain the signal.  
We assume that the production costs functions are strongly separable. Then, for a high-effort 
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L 1.  
There exists a third party that designs an inspection plan of randomly chosen firms to detect 
safety failure. To detect safety failure the third party monitors the level of safety effort the 
firm has implemented. This effort is only partly observable in the results the firm has 
achieved.  All firms face to the same probability of being inspected, c. However, we assume 
that the probability of failure decreases with the level of safety the firm has implemented. 
Then,  ) 1 ( H H e c p − =  and  ) 1 ( L L e c p − =  implying L H p p ≤  because undertaking preventive 
safety measures can reduce contamination risks but doesn’t allow to completely avoiding it  
(Segerson, 1999).  
Failing firms are punished under a penalties scheme according to their size, yi, whatever the 
safety effort they implemented. Indeed, when a safety failure is detected, a failing firm need 
to recall its products and then could loose a part or even the whole of its production. 
Consequently, the bigger they are, the larger the loss due to safety failures is.  
We assume that a firm, which is indifferent between the implementation of high-effort level 
or a low-effort level, will always adopt a high level of effort.  
The firm compares the expected costs of providing each alternative that are for high-effort 
firms 
i H H i y p e y C + ) ; (  and for a low -effort firm 
i L L i y p e y C + ) ; ( .    11
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The firm i will adopt a high level of safety effort if and only if:  
)) ( ) ( ( ) (
*
L H L H i L H be ae e e c y be ae − − − ≤ −  
(1) 
According to condition (1)  *
i y  is such as  ) ( *
L H i be ae y − = λ  with  )). ( ) ( (
L H L H be ae e e c − − − = λ  
When  0 > λ , then condition (1) implies: 
i i y y ≤ * , 
H i e e =  
, *
i i y y >  
L i e e =  
 
When  0 ≤ λ , then condition (1) implies that  , i ∀  
L i e e = .  
That is,  
0 0 ≤ − − − ⇔ ≤ ) ( ) (












Condition (2) implies that c the probability to be inspected must be high enough to induce 
that firms according to their size would choose a high level of safety effort.  
From Condition 2., we derive Proposition 1 and Proposition 1Bis.   12









, firms will 
implement a low level of safety effort, whatever their size.  









) larger firms exert a high level of 
effort in monitoring the safety of their products.   
We note E  the average safety effort provided by the firms within the group. We assume that 
E  is the observable proxy of the performance of the collective agreement.  
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= , with  * c  as a probability is such as  1 0 ≤ ≤ * c ,  
We determine how an increase in c, the frequency of inspections impacts on E. 
First, in the case where  * c c≤ , then 






Until  * c c= , increasing the number of inspections has no impact onE . In such a situation, the 
average level of safety within the group E  just depends on the exogenous level of low effort 





c* . Consequently, the probability that cis lower than  * c is higher in collective agreement 
where 
L e is set at a high level. Indeed, the higher 
L e , the higher  * c .    13
 Second, in the case where  * c c> , then  * *) ( y e y e E
L H + − = 1 and,  
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E . Increasing c leads to an increase in E, the performance 
of the collective agreement, at a decreasing rate. Namely, the higher the frequency of 
inspections, the lower the marginal effect of the number of inspections.  
Proposition 2: When  * c c≤ , the performance of the collective agreement, to food safety 
(namely, E) only relies on the given level of minimal requirements 
L e . Otherwise, when 
* c c> , increasing the frequency of inspections increases the performance of a collective 
agreement.  
4. Empirical Analysis. 
Survey and methodology 
To test our propositions, we study one particular case, namely the safety self-monitoring 
agreement that exists on one of the most important import market of fresh produce in France 
(Perpignan, South of France). Perpignan import market is the first on the three European main 
imports markets of Fresh produce ahead of Milan and Munich. 1350 million tons of produce 
are sold every year on the Perpignan import market. It represents more than 92% of the 
French traffic of fruit and vegetables (Sources:  http://www.saintcharlesinternational.com/public). In 
2001, a safety self-monitoring agreement was voluntarily initiated and drafted by a group of 
importers and then approved by French public authorities in charge for safety controls on the 
French import market (Codron et al., forthcoming). This program was initiated following 
changes in food safety regulation that are characterised by an increase in the involvement and   14
responsibility of private actors with regard to food safety inspections. Since 1998, importers 
of fruit and vegetables must individually implement a system of self-monitoring to guarantee 
the safety of the produce they sell. French importers must then comply with a performance 
standard: the food operators must achieve prescribed product quality standards and/or safety 
level. The way to achieve the safety standard is left to their discretion (Henson and Caswell, 
1999). In France, the safety of fresh produce is one-dimensional. Produce must satisfy the 
MRLs (Maximal Residue Limits) for pesticides defined by both European and French 
regulations
2.  
The safety self-monitoring agreement of Perpignan promotes a collective framework for the 
management of safety controls through a collective code of conduct for monitoring the safety 
level of supplies. The main objective of the collective self-monitoring agreement is to make 
sure that imported produce marketing in France satisfy these MRLs. By participating to the 
agreement, importers voluntarily abide to implement the collective safety procedure and to 
carry out laboratory analyses to monitor MRLs on fresh produce. At least, firms must carry-
out at least 10 laboratory analyses a year, whatever their size. 
We use a data set from a survey that was conducted with French importers of fresh produce 
on the Perpignan import market. The interviews were conducted in July 2006 on a face-to-
face basis with firm owners, or employees (the person in charge of quality or salesman). The 
interviewees were asked about the characteristics of their firm, supplies and sales, resources 
allocated to safety monitoring and about their motivations to join the safety self-monitoring 
agreement. We collected figures for 55 firms, over the 65 members of the safety self-
monitoring agreement (See appendix 1 for the statistical description).  
                                                 
2 When the MRL is not defined at the European level, the French MRL prevails.    15
Analysis and Results 
In this section, we test whether the monitoring effort  observed in a firm (on-site safety 
inspections through analyses of residues of pesticides)
3 can be related to the heterogeneity of 
the group members. We study the determinants of the firms’ effort level for importers that 
committed themselves in the self-monitoring safety agreement
4. We define an indicator 
standing for the effort level (on-site safety inspections through analyses of residues of 
pesticides) the firm chooses concerning the monitoring of food safety. We then turn to the 
empirical analysis of the determinants of this level. 
Our dependant variable is an indicator of the effort level the firm chooses in order to monitor 
the safety of its products: Safety Effort. Firms were asked about the number of laboratory 
analyses they carry out to monitor the safety quality of the products. We assume that the 
minimum number of laboratory analyses firms must implement within the agreement is 
defined in a way that all firms could join the agreement. That is to say that the minimum 
number is defined to avoid the exclusion of the smallest firms of the industry. The minimum 
number of analyses is 10 analyses a year. However, larger firms are supposed to voluntarily 
implement more laboratories analyses according to their size than the compulsory minimum 
number of analyses. The effort made by the firm i in monitoring safety is the number of 
laboratory analysis implemented in 2005 relatively to the firm’s turnover for the same year. 
                                                 
3  Substitutable strategies exist in order to guarantee safety: for example the supervision of the production 
process aims at lowering the risks. We captured the potential endogeneity of the governance structure chosen by 
the firm by using a bi-probit estimation that simultaneously investigates the determinants of the production 
integration level, and the determinants of the ex-post pesticide analysis. The results turned out to be very similar 
to that of the simple probit estimation we present hereafter. Consequently, and as we just work with a 55 
observations sample, we decided to keep the probit: a second survey will be conducted by spring 2007 to get an 
exhaustive sample of French importers who participate to this voluntary programs.  
 
4 We didn’t correct for potential selection bias that could occur when selecting only importers that decided to 
enter into the group for two reasons. First, our analytical framework focuses on the firms’ behaviour when they 
are in the group as moral hazard may be at stake. Second, on the statistical point of view, all non-participating 
firms that were interviewed reported zero effort: they don’t implement pesticide analysis on their products, so 
that a comparison between the effort levels of members and non-members is straightforward   16
We then compared this figure to the number of analysis per unit of turn-over that the first 
quartile of firms within the group (denoted Q25, in our case the 14
th smallest ones) carried out.  
If our indicator of safety effort of the firm i is higher then we say that the effort level is high 
and affected by 1, and otherwise is low and takes 0. Let Ti be the turnover of firm i and Ani 
the number of analysis.  

















i E then  Safetyeffort is affected by 1 and the effort level is said to be high 
If 1 <
i E then Safetyeffort is affected by 0 and the effort level is said to be low 
Using this definition, we find there are 33 low-effort firms in our sample that is 60% of the 
sample. These firms are smaller than the one considered as high-effort firms and their average 
turnover is 10,1 k€ (respectively, 25,1 k€ for those with a high effort level), but their 
dispersion is lower: the standard error is 8,3 compared to 19,05  for the high-effort firms.  
To test our theoretical propositions we test the following model: 
i i i i Z Y X rt Safetyeffo prob ε δ γ β α + + + + = ' ' ' ) (  
We evaluate the impact of three sets of variables on the probability to choose a high effort 
level: 
Xi is a set of variables summarizing the characteristics of the firm. We consider characteristics 
such as the size, the firm’s specialization, the main characteristics of its first customer and 
supplier and firm’s dependence relatively to its main customer. The main characteristics of 
first customer and supplier were used to assess how the upstream and downstream 
relationships of the firm could influence the level of safety effort the firm will exert.    17
-  The firm’s size is approximated by the number of permanent employees employees 
-  To take into account of the firm’s upstream and downstream relationships we 
consider two variables:  
o  DirectSupp is a dummy variable standing for the type of the major supplier. 
DirectSupp is affected by 1 when this supplier is an identified one. By 
identified, we mean that the produce comes directly from producers, either 
from the firm’s own production, a production site in which the firm 
invested, or when fresh produce comes from a direct producer. DirectSupp 
is affected by 0 .  Otherwise, that is there is a third party between the 
producer and the importer (cooperatives, exporters and other types of 
suppliers).  
o  To approximate the firm’s downstream relationship, we consider the type 
of the major French customer (in terms of the firm’s turnover).  Importers 
have two main customers: Supermarkets and wholesaler. CustFce1  is 
dummy variable with 0 when the main customer of the firm is a 
“wholesaler” and with 1 when it is “supermarkets”.  
o   We approximate the dependence level of the firm by the share in the firm’s 
turnover represented by the major French customer is: CaCustFce1.  
Yi contains the characteristics of the main product the firm sells, namely that represents the 
highest proportion in the firm’s turnover. We selected two characteristics of this major 
produce.  
- Branding indicates if the firm owns a brand on the first produce it sells.  
- We consider that a firm is specialized (Specialization is 1) when the share of one 
product it sells represents more than 30% of its turnover. Specialization is 0 otherwise.    18
Last, Zi is a vector of environmental characteristics; in particular, we are interested in 
studying if the public threat, individual commercial threat, and collective aspects of the 
agreement have an impact on the decision of exerting a high effort level. 
-  We create a dummy variable PUthreat  to approximate the threat that public 
authorities could exert on firms with respect to safety issues. Respondents were 
asked how they feel about this public threat on safety. PUthreat is 1 if the threat is 
considered as “important” (0 otherwise). 
-  In the same way, we created a dummy variable CMthreat to approximate the 
commercial threat, particularly the one supermarket could exert on firm. 
Respondents were asked how they feel about this commercial threat CMthreat is 1 
if the respondent consider this threat interfere with the firm’s activity (0 
otherwise).  
-  By participating in the safety agreement, importers benefit from a discount on 
prices of laboratories analyses. This discount is about 20% on the price of residues 
analyses
5. To take into account of the collective aspects of the agreement, we 
create a dummy variable ImutCont. ImutCont takes 1 when respondents consider 





                                                 
5 This is not marginal as the price of a “basic analysis” for pesticides residues is about of €300 for one sample of 
fresh produce.   19
Results 
The results of our regressions are presented in table 1.  
Table1. Regression Results. 
 
Endogenous variable 
Safety Effort  
Coefficients (T) 
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Student-T in parenthesis. For 10% significance Student-Tvalue=1.67, for 5% significance Student-Tvalue=   
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Firm’s Characteristics:  
Variables standing for firm’s characteristics are significant. However, some of the coefficients 
are quite surprising particularly the influence of the size.  
The firm’s size represented by the number of permanent employees has a negative effect on 
the safety level exerted by firm. Relatively to their size, large firms exert lower safety effort 
than small firm, which is contradictory of what we could expect, especially if we think that 
large firms entertain a high reputation level. Larger firms are expected to be more self-
conscious about produce safety and were expected to implement a level of safety according to 
their size. As we worked out our variable of effort, we assume that the minimum number of 
analysis had been designed for the smallest firms in the industry. According to this point, the 
public authorities would like that all firms behave in the same way they expect that the 
smallest firm would behave. However, it seems that the size of the firms does not really 
influence the level of safety they will adopt. We thus validate the proposition 1 and invalidate 
proposition1Bis.  
The dummy variable that represents the direct supply of the firm is significantly positive. 
However, direct supplies should decrease the need of exerting downstream safety controls. 
We could explain this result in two ways. First, direct supplies involve commitment in the 
production process, directly or indirectly. By investing in the production process an importer 
devotes resources to the product it will sell on the French market. Then, importers should 
exert a higher effort level to preserve their product and thus to preserve this “risky” 
investment. Note that such transaction arrangements are developing and importers are more 
and more integrating the production process. Second, even if the supplier is well-known by 
the firm the transaction requires a commitment from both parties, leading to transaction costs. 
The breakdown of such an arrangement entails losses for both sides, in particular because   21
such contracts are very frequently exclusive. Exerting high effort level on safety issue is a 
way to preserve the transaction: importers protect themselves from moral hazard issues.  
Last, if the major customer is a supermarket the probability of exerting a high effort level is 
higher than if the firm sells its produce to a wholesaler. In fact, supermarkets are known to be 
tough commercial partners. They also represent great opportunities for firms in terms of 
volume. As fresh produce is generally considered as generic product, customers can switch 
from one supplier to another. Firms try then to contract with supermarkets to maintain this 
“brittle” relationship where supermarkets hold all the negotiation power. Exerting a high 
effort level concerning safety is a way to preserve this relationship even it is not a mean for 
firms to differentiate themselves.  
Firm’s product: 
Specialized firms –that is, firms for which the major product represents more than 30% of the 
sales- are more likely to exert a high effort level. So are firms that have invested in branding 
strategies for their main products. Generally, specialized firms operate in very particular 
sectors: specific products (organic carrot, frozen broccoli) or very sensitive one (strawberry, 
green bean, raspberry). They ensure their reputation and their market share (niche market)  by 
ensuring quality. The same statement can be made for firms that engaged in branding 
strategies. Safety can be considered as a “quality” posture in order to raise their market share.  
Environmental Characteristics: 
The way environmental characteristics influence firms’ decision is very insightful. 
Concerning the commercial threat a firm that feels this commercial threat exerts a higher 
effort level. It is consistent with firms willing to maintain their market share and to 
consolidate their business structure.  
As expected, the collective benefits of the agreement have a positive influence on the effort 
level. When firms view the collective aspects of the agreement as being important, they are   22
more likely to exert a high effort level. Firms that would have devoted resources to safety 
controls operate more analysis.  
Unexpectedly, when a firm considers that the public threat exerted by public authorities is real 
and important, it is more likely to exert a low level of monitoring effort. In fact, the credibility 
of this public threat seems at stake in this complex influence. On the one hand, from a legal 
point of view, firms remain uninformed about the behavior they should adopt to comply with 
regulations. For a large proportion of the observed firms, it leads to a minimum compliance 
with the requirements set by the agreement: to take any reasonable precaution in order to 
ensure food safety is understood as implementing the 10 laboratory analysis stated by the 
agreement. Firms only refer to the minimum level they must implement, that is they only refer 
to the level, which is compulsory. They do not voluntarily go far away beyond this 
compulsory level.  
On the other hand, firms know that they can be inspected, even though the sanctions are rather 
rare in case of misbehavior in the monitoring procedure, and remain often verbal. Thus, public 
threat is not particularly credible in firms’ eyes, but it seems to be a punctual constraint in 
firms’ activity through random public inspections. 
These statements lead us to validate proposition 2. According to the empirical results, an 
increase in the number of inspections won’t induce an increase in the safety level 
implemented by firms. Indeed, even if firms fear public inspections, this doesn’t lead them to 
implement a higher level of safety. The effort level they implement is thus not linked to their 
perception of the public threat. We may think that, food safety through analyzing pesticides 
residues is a new stake for French importers of fruit and vegetables.  In the case of the 
collective self-monitoring agreement, importers seem to misunderstand what public 
authorities are expecting from them through this new regulatory instrument. The voluntary   23
characteristic of the instrument seems to be constrained by the compulsory minimal level of 
safety measures the firm must exert to be part of the collective agreement.   
5. Discussion.  
In this paper we deal with individual behavior within a collective voluntary approach to food 
safety. We characterize situations in which a third party could higher the performance of a 
collective voluntary program by intensifying the frequency of inspections in individual firms. 
We show that increasing the number of inspections can be useless if the threat of being 
inspected is not sufficiently high. Then firms only refer to the minimum level, which is 
compulsory they must implement. They do not voluntarily go far away beyond this 
compulsory level. We tested this proposition in our empirical model and show that the 
credibility of public inspections need be questioned. Even though interviewees report that 
they fear public authority’s action, this threat doesn’t lead to an increase of the number of 
residues analysis they would carry out.  
This result leads us to question the design of collective agreement to food safety, at least in 
the fresh produce industry. Indeed, the behavior of the major part of the firms seems to be 
constrained by the minimum numbers of analyses they must implement in the agreement 
without taking into account their own characteristics. Firms implement the level of safety, 
which is compulsory. We thus bring two conclusions into light. First, when the treat of being 
inspected is useless, to be effective such voluntary programs should provide a minimum 
compulsory level that must be high. However, such voluntary program even they are more 
effective raises an exclusion issue, particularly for the access to such voluntary program for 
medium and small firms. Second, if the minimum compulsory level negotiated with firm is 
low, particularly to avoid such exclusion issues, then the treat to be inspected must be high 
enough and credible. Therefore, in order to be really effective, such programs need to define   24
an appropriate scheme of safety levels according to both participants firms’ characteristics 
and to the minimal negotiated safety requirements that firms and public authorities negotiate. 
Their enforcement induces thus sort of differentiated compulsory constraints and their cost-
effectiveness from the public authorities point of view should be questioned, as their 
efficiency from a societal point view.   
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Appendix1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Variables  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max 
             
SafetyEffort  54 0,61  0,49  0  1 
nbrepest05  53 27.45  28.54  5  150 
             
Firm's Characteristics                
             
Employees  55 13.63  13.52  1.5 79 
CaCustFce  53 71.92  18.65  30 100 
CustFrce  55 0,33  0,47  0  1 
DirectSup         55 0,34  0,48  0  1 
             
Firm's product                
             
Specialisation  55 0,38  0,49  0  1 
Reputation   55 0,42  0,49  0  1 
             
Environmental Characteristics                
             
CMthreat  55 0,64  0,48  0  1 
Puthreat  55 0,74  0,44  0  1 
Imutcont  55 0,83  0,37  0  1 